UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

2-13-2008

State v. Araiza Appellant's Brief Dckt. 34402

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Araiza Appellant's Brief Dckt. 34402" (2008). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 1636.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1636

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

1

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

)
)

NO. 34402

1
ROY ROLAND ARAIZA, SR.,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

)

)

1
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF JEROME
HONORABLE JOHN K. BUTLER
District Judge
MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. # 4843
SARA B. THOMAS
Chief, Appellate Unit
I.S.B. # 5867

KENNETHK.JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ldaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. # 6555
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, ldaho 83703
(208) 334-2712
ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................................

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE................................................................................I

Nature of the Case ....................................
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings...............................................................................I

..................
ISSUE PRESENTED ON..APPEAL

7

ARGUMENT........................................................................................................

8

I. The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Araiza's Motion
To Suppress The Warrantless Entry lnto His Residence
And Arrest Of His Person In Violation Of The Fourth
Amendment Of The United States Constitution And
Article I, § 17 Of The Idaho Constitution.....................................................8
A. Introduction ...........................................................................................
8

0. Standard Of Review ..............................................................................8
C. The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Araiza's
Motion To Suppress Where There Was Not Exigent
Circumstances Justifying The Officers Warrantless
Entry Into His Residence.......................................................................
8
D. The District Court Erred In Concluding That Officer Clark
Had Probable Cause To Arrest Mr. Araiza For Resisting
And Obstructing Police Officers .........................................................
.I3
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................
45
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING...............................................................................
16

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
Johnson v. United States. 333 U.S. 10 (1948) ....................................................
I0
State v. Arregui. 44 Idaho 43. 254 P.788 (1927) .............................................9. 13
State v. Atkinson. 128 Idaho 559. 916 P.2d 1284 (Ct. App . 1996)........................8
State v. Barrett. 138 Idaho 290. 62 P.3d 214 (Ct. App . 2003) .............................10
State v. Henderson. 114 Idaho 293. 298. 756 P.2d 1057. 1062 (1988).............. 14
State v. Mclntee. 124 Idaho 803. 864 P.2d 641 (Ct. App . 1993)...........................9
State v. Rusho. 110 Idaho 556. 716 P.2d 1328 (Ct. App . 1986) .........................10
State v. Weaver. 127 Idaho 288. 900 P.2d 196 (1995);........................................9

.

State v. Wiedenheft. 136 Idaho 14. 27 P.3d 873 (Ct. App . 2001) .................1-l 13
State v. Wight. 117 Idaho 604. 790 P.2d 385 (Ct. App . 1990)..............................9
State v. Wilkerson. 114 Idaho 174. 755 P.2d 471 (Ct. App . 1998)......................14
United States v. United States District Court. 407 U.S.297 (1972) ....................10
Welsh v. Wisconsin. 466 U.S. 740 (1984)...........................................................
I0
Wong Sun v. United States. 371 U.S. 471. 83 S.Ct. 407 (1963).....................
9. 13

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Roy Roland Araiza entered an ldaho Criminal Rule (hereinaffer, Rule) 1l(a)(2)
conditional plea of guilty to possession of a controlled substance, preserving his right to
appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. The district court imposed a
unified sentence of seven years, with one year fixed, upon Mr. Araiza. Mr. Araiza's right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures protected by the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I § I 7 of the ldaho
Constitution were violated when officers broke down the door of his residence and
arrested him for obstructing and delaying a police investigation. Specifically, officers did
not have probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed, nor was there a
"compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant." See Welsh
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749 (1984); State

v.

v. Wiedenheft, 136 ldaho 14, 27 P.3d 873

(Ct. App. 2001).
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinas
In December of 2006, Mary Jane Mosqueda lived at 108 E. Avenue F in Jerome,
Idaho, and had resided there for almost three years. (Tr., p.51, L.24 - p.52, L.4.) Since
July of that year, her son, Roy Araiza, had been living with her in the residence.
(Tr., p.53, Ls.2-22.)

On December 2, 2006, during the late evening hours,

Ms. Mosqueda was awakened by a knock on her front door. (Tr., p.55, Ls.11-19.)
Ms. Mosqueda got out of bed, went to the door, and opened it, to discover that it was

her son ROY.' (Tr., p.55, Ls.20-22.) Ms. Mosqueda let her son into the residence.
(Tr., p.56, Ls.1-2.)

A short time later, there was another knock on the door and

Ms. Mosqueda answered the door a second time, to discovered law enforcement
officers standing outside her door. (Tr., p.59, L.3

- p.57, L.2.)

Officer Dennis Clark

inquired as to whether everything was okay at the residence and indicated that he had
seen someone outside one of the windows of the residence. (Tr., p.8, Ls.1-19, p.57,
Ls.3-12.) Ms. Mosqueda stated that everything was okay and informed Officer Clark
that the individual that was outside her residence was "my son. He was knocking on the
window of my other grandson to let him in."' (Tr., p.8, L.3 - p.9, L.8, p.57, Ls.12-14.)
Officer Clark then requested to speak with her son and Ms. Mosqueda called to her son,
Mr. Araiza, who was lying down in bed, to come speak to the officers. (Tr., p.57, L.21 p.58, L.lO.)

Ms. Mosqueda went back to her room while Mr. Araiza spoke to the

officers. (Tr.,p.58, L.18-p.59, L.2.)
During his conversation with Mr. Araiza, Officer Clark requested to see
Mr. Araiza's identification. (Tr., p.10, L.24

- p.1I , L.2.)

Mr. Araiza informed Officer

Clark that he "never had a driver's license, but he had once been issued a state
identification card." (Tr., p.1I,
Ls.2-4.) Mr. Araiza then "verbally identified himself' by
giving Officer Clark his social security number, name and date of birth. (Tr., p.11, Ls.2-

I

Ms. Mosqueda testified that although her son, Mr. Araiza, lived at the residence, he did not have a key.
(Tr.., 0.53.
Ls.2-12., .0.55.. Ls.23-25.)
,
lnterest/ngly, Officer James ~ a k e r Officer
,
Clark's commanding officer, who was also on the scene and
ultimately made the decision to make a forcible entry, testified that Officer Clark "never even told me that
he had talked to the occupant in the house, the person who owned the house." (Tr., p.40, Ls.1-18, p.43,
L.24 p.44, L.l, p.45, L.25 - p.46, L.4.) In fact, Officer Baker testified that when he arrived on the scene,
Officer Clark "told me about the gentleman appearing in the window or trying to get into a window and
that the guy had apparently gone into the residence," but Officer Clark had failed to tell his supervisor that
he had already talked to the owner of the residence and was informed that everything was okay. (Tr.,
p.45, Ls.16-24.)

'

-

6.)

Officer Clark returned to his vehicle and ran the information given to him by

Mr. Araiza and it came back with "no record found," which does not necessarily mean
incorrect information was given, but that the individual may not have a record in the
system. (Tr., p.12, L.l - p.13, L.3, p.31, L.18 - p.33, L.22.) Officer Clark acknowledged
that he later concluded that Mr. Araiza had given him the correct social security number
and date of birth. (Tr., p.38, L.23

- p.39, L.4.)

Officer Clark returned his police cruiser to run Mr. Araiza's identifying information
and Mr. Araiza went back into his residence. (Tr., p.12, L.l

- p.13,

L.19.)

Upon

returning, Officer Clark "knocked on the front door in an attempt to get [Mr. Araiza] to
come back," then apparently tried to let himself into the residence but the "front door
was found to be locked." (Tr., p. 13, Ls. 17-25.) Officer Clark, and the other officers now
present at the residence "continued to knock at the door, and then I even went around
to different windows of the house and knocked at the windows," for the next several
minutes. (Tr., p.13, L.25

- p.14,

L.7.) Officer Clark testified that "nobody" at the

residence would answer the door. (Tr., p.14, Ls.3-5.) Officer Baker testified that "We
could see them through the window and they seem to be ignoring us."3 (Tr., p.42,
Ls.21-25.)
"Due to the commotion" made by the officers' continued knocking, a neighbor,

"later identified as the daughter of' Ms. Mosqueda came over to see what was going
on.

(Tr., p.14, Ls.8-16 (emphasis added).)

According to Officer Clark the sister

allegedly told him that she did not recognize, nor was she familiar with her brother's

Officer Baker testified that he knew there was an adult female, a male, and children in the house, but
"couldn't figure out who the adult male was," likely because Officer Clark did not disclose his earlier
conversation with Ms. Mosqueda, to his colleague. (Tr., p.42, L.20 p.43, L.2.)

-

3

name? (Tr., p.15, Ls.3-8.) Mr. Clark then "continued to knock on the door" and asked
the sister to try can call her mother on the cell phone, but did not get an answer.
(Tr., p.15, Ls.19-23.) Officer Clark then testified that another individual, a young male
who identified himself as Ms. Mosqueda's grandson, showed up at the residence in his
vehicle and allegedly indicated that to Officer Clark that he had no idea who the person
in the residence and that person "should not be inside of his grandmother's house."
(Tr., p.16, L . l l

- p.17, L.17 - p.9.)

Officer Clark never gave a physical description of

Mr. Araiza to his sister or nephew. (Tr., p.17, Ls.6-10.) Officer Clark testified that they
continued to "try to gain access to the house" by "knocking at the windows, knocking at
the doors, [and] yelling inside from the outside," but where unsuccessful. (Tr., p.17,
Ls. 10-17.)
At that point, Officer Clark testified that the officer's decided to make a "forcible
entry" into the residence for the safety of the children and elderly female. (Tr., p.17,
L.21 - p.18, L.3.) The forible entry was made despite information that Ms. Mosqueda
had told Officer Clark that everything was okay, the officers had not observed anything
of a violent nature, the officers did not seek any physical contact between the parties in
the residence, and the officers did not hear any arguing in the house as it was "dead
silent." (Tr., p.30, L.22

- p.31,

L . l (Officer Clark testifying that Ms. Mosqueda said

everything was okay), p.34, Ls.6-15) (Officer Clark testifying that he heard no unusual
noises or calls for help coming from the residence), p.45, L.25 - p.46 (Officer Baker
testifying that he did not know Officer Clark had spoken with the elderly female in the
house), L.7, p.49, L.22 - p.50, L.50, L.6 (Officer Baker testifying about lack of violence
4

Officer Clark testified, under oath, that Mr. Araiza's sister told him that "she didn't know anybody" named
Roy Araiza. (Tr., p.15, Ls.9-12.)

and noise at the residence).) In fact, both Officer Clark and Officer Baker conceded that
at the time they made a forcible entry into the residence, they were unaware of any
crime that had been or was being committed.

(Tr., p.34, Ls.16-18 (Officer Clark

testifying), p.50, Ls.9-12 (Officer Baker testifying).)
After Ms. Mosqueda's door was "forcibly broken down," Mr. Araiza was
handcuffed and arrested for resisting and obstructing a police officer. (Tr., p.35, Ls.611; R., pp.7-8.) Officer Clark then went to an "opposite bedroom" from where Mr. Araiza
was placed into custody to discover his jacket and a duffel bag allegedly belonging to
Mr. Araiza. (Tr., p.19, L.21 - p.20, L.4.) Officer Clark stated that "in plain sight" in the
unzipped duffel back, he observed a "glass pipe with a whitish burnt residue."
(Tr., p.20, Ls.5-10.) Officer Clark testified, "After seeing the pipe on top or inside the top
of the bag, I took the bag and removed it out into the kitchen area." (Tr., p.20, Ls.16-

19.) He continued, "I started to go through the contents briefly of the bag, making sure
that there wasn't anything that needed to stay in the residence for any purposes, and to
check for additional paraphernalia and/or controlled

substance^."^ (Tr., p.20, Ls.20-24.)

Mr. Araiza was charged with felony possession of a controlled substance and
(R., pp.16-17.) Mr. Araiza filed a motion to
misdemeanor possession of parapherna~ia.~
suppress the contents discovered in his duffel bag as the warrantless entry into his
home and subsequent arrest were improper. (Tr., p.68, Ls.2-24; R., pp.21-22.) The
district court held a hearing on the suppression motion and entered a written
Memorandum Decision and Order denying Mr. Araiza's motion to suppress. (R., pp.23Unfortunately, the search of Mr. Araiza's duffel baa was not challenged below as an illeaal search of
property not $thin his "lunge" area incident to arrest- See State v. ~amay,140 Idaho 834, 103 P.3d 448
(2004).

33.) Mr. Araiza then entered a Rule 1I(a)(2) conditional plea of guilty to possession of
a controlled substance, preserving his right to appeal the district court's denial of his
suppression motion, and the State agreed to dismissing the paraphernalia charge.

(R., pp.39-42, 60.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with
one year fixed, upon Mr. Araiza's plea of guilty to possession of a controlled substance.

(R., pp.53-58.) Mr. Araiza filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the district court's
judgment of conviction. (R., pp.63-64.)

Of note, it doesn't appear that Mr. Araiza was ever charged with resisting or obstructing a police
investigation.

6

ISSUE
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Araiza's motion to suppress the warrantless
entry into his residence and arrest of his person in violation of the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution?

ARGUMENT

The District Court Erred In Denvina Mr. Araiza's Motion To Suppress The Warrantless
Entw lnto His Residence And Arrest Of His Person In Violation Of The Fourth
Amendment Of The United States Constitution And Article I, 5 17 Of The ldaho
Constitution
A.

Introduction
Mr. Araiza asserts that his right to be free from unreasonable searches and

seizures as articulated in the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
Article I, § 17 of the ldaho Constitution were violated when officers forcibly entered his
residence without a warrant or exigent circumstances and arrested him for resisting and
obstructing a police officer without probable cause.
B.

Standard Of Review
Mr. Araiza contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to

suppress. The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial
court's findings of fact which were supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews
the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128
ldaho 559, 561,916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996).
C.

The District Court Erred In Denvina Mr. Araiza's Motion To Suppress Where
There Was Not Exigent Circumstances Justifvina The Officers Warrantless Entry
lnto His Residence
Mr. Araiza asserts that his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United

States Constitution, as well as his rights pursuant to Article I, § 17 of the ldaho
Constitution were violated when officers of the Jerome County City Police Department

entered his residence without a warrant and without exigent circumstances and arrested
him for resisting and obstructing a police investigation without probable cause. The
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 17 of the ldaho
Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. Warrantless searches are
presumed to be unreasonable and thus, violations of the Fourth Amendment and
Article I, § 17. State v. Weaver, 127 ldaho 288, 900 P.2d 196 (1995); State v. Mclntee,
124 ldaho 803, 864 P.2d 641 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Wight, 117 ldaho 604, 790 P.2d
385 (Ct. App. 1990). However, the State may rebut this presumption by establishing
that a warrantless search either fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant
requirement, or was otherwise reasonable under the circumstances.

Weaver, 127

ldaho at 290, 900 P.2d at 198; Mclntee, 124 ldaho at 804, 864 P.2d at 642. If evidence
is not seized pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, the
evidence discovered as a result of the illegal search must be excluded as the "fruit of
the poisonous tree."

Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); see also

State v. Arregui, 44 ldaho 43, 254 P.788 (1927) (adopting an exclusionary rule under
the ldaho Constitution).
The United States Supreme Court has eloquently explained the importance of a
warrant in searching a person's place of abode:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its
protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.... The
right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is ... a grave concern, not
only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable
security and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must
reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by

a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement
agent.
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (citations omitted) (emphasis
added). In fact, "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of
the Fourth Amendment is directed." United States v. United States District Courf, 407
U.S. 297, 313 (1972). Entrance into a residence, without a warrant, is justified only
when an officer possess probable cause and can demonstrate an urgent need to
dispose of the traditional warrant requirement. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740,
749 (1984).
The exigent circumstances exception is justified only when the "facts known to
the police at the time of the entry . . . demonstrate a 'compelling need for official action
and no time to secure a warrant."' State v. Barrett, 138 ldaho 290, 293, 62 P.3d 214,
217 (Ct. App. 2003) (quoting State v. Pearson-Anderson, 136 ldaho 847, 849, 41 P.3d
275, 279 (Ct. App. 2001)). Under this analysis, there must be "probable cause to
believe that an intruder exists and it reasonably appears that persons and property are
in immediate danger." State v. Rusho, 110 ldaho 556, 560, 716 P.2d 1328, 1332
(Ct. App. 1986). Using an objective standard, the appellate court determines "whether
those facts and inferences would 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that
the action taken was appropriate."' Id (quoting Pearson-Anderson, 136 ldaho at 850, 41
P.3d at 278).
Here, the district 'court determined, based on testimony from the officers that they
were concerned for the welfare of Ms. Mosqueda and the children in the residence, and
the testimony from Officer Clark that two relatives allegedly could not identify
Mr. Araiza's name, the officers' actions were appropriate and an exigent circumstance

existed. (R., pp.27-31.) The district court erred in its determination. The district court
relied on State v. Wiedenheft, 136 ldaho 14, 27 P.3d 873 (Ct. App. 2001) in denying
Mr. Araiza's motion to s~ppress.~Wiedenhelf is illustrative as it demonstrates those
situations where exigent circumstances might be justified as compared to the instant
case, where the actions of the officers were absolutely inappropriate and are the
quintessential acts for which the Fourth Amendment provides protection.

In

Wiedenheft, officers were dispatched to a residence to investigate a 911 call reporting a
possible domestic violence altercation. Id. at 15, 27 P.3d at 874. When Wiedenhelf
answered the door, she "had a red swollen area in the middle of her forehead and
appeared to have been recently injured." Id. She "also appeared to be shaking slightly,
had an unsteady voice, and was visibly upset." Id. An officer asked if there was a
problem and "Wiedenheft indicated that there was not and refused entry into the home."
Id. Thinking that there was "something amiss," the officer sought entry into the home to

determine her safety and of anyone else in the home. Id. Wiedenhelf refused entry
again and ultimately struck officers at the door, with the door, as she attempted to shut
it. Id. Wiedenhelf was arrested for resisting and obstructing a police officer. Id. Citing
to six cases from other jurisdiction where officers went on domestic violence calls and
observed physical injury, nervousness, or a residence that was in disarray, the Court of
Appeals determined that given all of the information available to the officers, their
actions were justified. Id. at 16-17, 47 P.3d at 876-877.

' The district court relied on Wiedenhelf in analyzing whether there was probable cause for the resisting

and obstructing arrest. (See R., pp.31-33.) However, as the Wiedenhelf Court made clear in its opinion,
"the answer to whether the officers were attempting to discharge a duty of their office depends on
whether there was substantial evidence to support a finding that 'exigent circumstances' existed to justify
the warrantless entry of Wiedenhelfs residence." 136 ldaho at 16, 17 P.3d at 375.

The facts of the present case are vastly different than those presented in
Wiedenhelf. In the instant case, after suspecting a burglary after seeing an individual
standing outside of a window at the Mosqueda residence, Officer Clark proceeded to
stop his car and knock on the front door after he was unable to locate the unidentified
man. (Tr., p.6, L.14 - p.7, L.9.) The owner of the residence, Ms. Mosqueda answered
the door. (Tr., p.7, L.10 - p.8, L.19.) Ms. Mosqueda did not appear to be in any
physical distress, her clothes were not disheveled, and she did not have apparent
physical injuries of any kind.

T r p.13, Ls.13-21.)

Officer Clark informed

Ms. Mosqueda that he had seen an individual outside of one of the windows in her
residence and she informed the officer that it was "my son. He was knocking on the
window of my other grandson to let him in." (Tr., p.8, L.3 - p.9, L.8, p.57, Ls.12-14.)
Ms. Mosqueda also informed Officer Clark that she was okay. (Tr., p.30, L.22 - p.31,
L.4.)

Thus, at that moment, whatever suspicions Officer Clark's may have had

dissipated; he had been informed that everything was normal in the Mosqueda
residence and should have ceased his "investigation" at that point. Moreover, prior to
breaking down the door at the residence, the officers had the opportunity to observe
(through windows while snooping around the property) the actions of the parties in the
residence and had not observed anything of a violent nature, did not see any physical
contact between the parties in the residence, and the officers did not hear any arguing
in the house as it was "dead silent." (Tr., p.30, L.22 - p.31, L.l, p.34, Ls.6-15, p.45,
L.25-p.46, L.7, p.49, L.22 -p.50, L.50, L.6.)
Thus, there was no evidence, much less probable cause, that would lead officers
to believe there was even an intruder in the residence, as Ms. Mosqueda told the

officers that the suspected intruder was her son and she was aware of his presence.
Moreover, there is no evidence that would lead a reasonable person to believe that
persons or property were in immediate danger, unlike the information available to the
officers in Wiedenhelf, supra. Accordingly, the district court erred in finding that there
were exigent circumstances sufficient to justify the forcible, warrantless entry into
Mr. Araiza's residence. Thus, the evidence found in this duffel bag, with derived of the
illegal police conduct should have been suppressed. Wong Sun

v. United States, 371

U.S. 471 (1963); see also State v. Arregui, 44 ldaho 43, 254 P.788 (1927) (adopting an
exclusionary rule under the ldaho Constitution).
D.

The District Court Erred In Concludinq That Officer Clark Had Probable Cause
To Arrest Mr. Araiza For Resistinq And Obstructinq Police Officers
Mr. Araiza asserts that the district court erred in determining that Officer Clark

had probable cause to arrest him for resisting and obstructing police officers. In finding
that Officer Clark possessed probable cause to arrest Mr. Araiza for resisting and
obstructing a police officer, the district court relied heavily on State

v. Wiedenhefi, 136

ldaho 14, 27 P.3d 873 (Ct. App. 2001). As is discussed in footnote 7, Wiedenhelf
Court's determination that there was probable cause to arrest Wiedenhelf was premised
on whether officers were acting under a lawful "duty" under I.C. 3 18-705 such that it
was necessary for officers to enter her residence to investigate or render aid or
assistance. Id. at 16, 47 P.3d at 875. The Court was clear to note that "the answer to
whether the officers were attempting to discharge a duty of their office depends on
whether there was substantial evidence to support a finding that 'exigent circumstances'
existed to justify the warrantless entry of Wiedenhelf's residence." Id. Here, as is

articulated above in section I(C) and incorporated herein by reference, Mr. Araiza
asserts that officers were without authority to forcibly enter his residence on the night in
question. Thus, "where an individual refuses to obey an order or obstructs an act of a
public officer which is contrary to the law, be it statute or constitution, the individual does
not violate I.C. § 18-705." State v. Wilkerson, 114 ldaho 174, 180, 755 P.2d 471, 477
(Ct. App. 1998).
Moreover, unlike the defendant in Wiederhelf, Mr. Araiza did not actively strike
any of the officers with the door in keeping them out, he just chose to ignore the
knocking on both windows and doors, snooping around his house, and yelling inside.
Mr. Araiza had apparently decided to ignore the Jerome police officers, which of course,
is his right pursuant to the 4'h Amendment.

As the ldaho Supreme Court has

recognized, "Perhaps the most important attribute of our way of life in ldaho is individual
liberty. A citizen is free to stroll the streets, hike the mountains, and float the rivers of
this state without interference from the government." State v. Henderson, 114 ldaho
293, 298, 756 P.2d 1057, 1062 (1988). Accordingly, based on the foregoing argument
and authority, Mr. Araiza asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress any and all evidence recovered from the search of his duffel bag following his
unlawful arrest should have been suppressed.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Araiza respectfully requests that the district court's order denying his motion
to suppress be reversed and the evidence resulting from the officer's illegal conduct be
suppressed.
DATED this 13" day of February, 2008.
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